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Sovereign Immunity and Patent Infringement,
Ten Years After Florida Prepaid:
The State of the Law and How It Can Be Fixed
MATTHEW PAIK*
INTRODUCTION
In the lucrative world of patents, the University of California is a
major player. It receives by far more patents from the U.S. government
than any school in the country. And by licensing out its intellectual
property, the university has generated about $500 million in revenue in
the past five years.
The school also aggressively uses the courts as a sword, and is
unafraid to take on big companies. As a plaintiff alleging patent
infringement, the school has settled a claim against Genentech Inc. for
$200 million, secured a payment of $i85 million from Monsanto Co.,
and won a $30 million settlement from Microsoft Corp.
Yet, when it comes to getting sued for patent infringement, the
university, as well as the state of California, are Teflon. A legal
doctrine known as sovereign immunity protects states and state
institutions from legal liability. Courts have held that participating in
the federal patent system doesn't cost a state its immunity. The
upshot-states can sue, but effectively can't be sued.'
An inventor can spend thousands of hours developing just the right
ratio for a new chemical, or the right combination of parts for that
elusive perfect mousetrap. To encourage this kind of dedication, effort,
and innovation, and to make these new innovations available to the
public, the U.S. patent system "exchanges" information about an
invention for the exclusive right to prevent others from making, selling,
and using the invention. In this exchange, the inventor makes his
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2oo9; B.A., Computer
Science, Columbia College, Columbia University, 2002. I would like to thank my family and friends for
all their love and support over the years. I am also grateful for all of the hard work put in by the
Hastings Law Journal staff in preparing this Note for publication.
i. Peter Lattman, Critics Take Aim at California's Patent Shield. WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2007, at
Bi.
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discoveries public, and in return, receives a twenty-year period of
exclusivity from the U.S. government. And although the word "inventor"
can conjure up images of a person experimenting in a garage somewhere,
the reality is that most patents are awarded to corporations, private
universities, and even states.' Nevertheless, all participants in the patent
system are held to the same basic rules: (I) the first to invent can obtain a
patent and receive protection for twenty years; and (2) if a patent exists,
and someone infringes, the infringer is liable for damages. That is, all
participants, except for one select group.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Florida Prepaid Secondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,3 this is the law: states
can sue for infringement of their patents, but they cannot be sued if they
infringe on patents held by private individuals.4 In other words, we have
"a situation in which some participants in the intellectual property
system get legal protection but need not adhere to the law themselves."5
This Note explains why Florida Prepaid was erroneously decided,
and suggests a few possible solutions. First, the Court could overrule
Florida Prepaid with the wiggle room it made for itself in Central
Virginia Community College v. Katz' and reinstate the Patent Remedy
Act. Second, Congress could pass a similar statute that would remove
state sovereign immunity with respect to patent infringement cases. The
first two Parts of this Note serve to provide the reader with the proper
backdrop for a discussion of Florida Prepaid. Part I of this Note gives the
reader some background by explaining the history behind the current
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, as well as a brief
introduction into the patent laws of this country. Part II gives a high-level
view of some of the recent activity in the area of patent rights and state
sovereign immunity. Lastly, Part III explains how and where the Court
went wrong in Florida Prepaid and discusses the proposed solutions
mentioned above.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE Two AREAS -SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE
U.S. PATENT SYSTEM
It is helpful to first understand the state of the law in the two areas
before discussing how they should properly intersect. Because the
doctrine of state sovereign immunity has expanded beyond the text of
2. States can obtain patents through the research conducted at state universities, such as the
University of California system mentioned in the Lattman article. See supra note i.
3. 527 U.S. 627,630 (1999).
4. Here, "individuals" also includes corporations, as they are considered to be "individuals" by
the law. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 641 n.6.
5. 149 CONG. REC. 13,98o (2OO3) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
6. 546 U.S. 356,376 n.13 (2oo6).
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the Eleventh Amendment, an overview of the relevant Supreme Court
cases is necessary to explain the development of this area of law.
A. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
While the principle of sovereign immunity is commonly believed to
be granted by the Eleventh Amendment,7 the reality is that the Supreme
Court has crafted this doctrine over the last two hundred years. Much
like a pendulum, the scope and breadth of the immunity has swung back
and forth with each subsequent Supreme Court decision. We start with
the text of the Amendment, and then discuss the line of cases that have
shaped the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The Eleventh Amendment, in its entirety, states: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."8 At least according to the text, the Amendment seems to bar the
United States government from entertaining lawsuits between a citizen
of one state against another state, or lawsuits between a citizen of a
foreign country and one of the states in the Union. The text does not say,
however, that the Amendment bars the federal government from hearing
cases between a citizen of a state against his own state. Yet, this is the
current understanding of the Eleventh Amendment.
To understand where this understanding came from, one must start
with Chisholm v. Georgia.9 In Chisholm, a South Carolina resident
attempted to sue the State of Georgia in the United States Supreme
Court, invoking Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution.' °
Georgia refused to appear, and the Supreme Court found for the
plaintiff." This decision was met with broad disapproval by the states,
and the Eleventh Amendment was proposed and ratified in 1795 in
response.'2 As the text states, the Amendment stripped federal
jurisdiction over cases between a citizen of a state and another state. 3
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
8. Id.
9. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
to. Id. at 420-21, 475. Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution states, in
relevant part, "[i]n all Cases... in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. IlI, § 2, cl. 2.
i i. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 469,479.
12. U.S. Constitution Annotated-State Sovereign Immunity, http://supreme.justia.com/
constitution/amendment-ii/ot-state-sovereign-immunity.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2009) ("The
Amendment proposed by Congress and ratified by the States was directed specifically toward
overturning the result in Chisholm and preventing suits against States by citizens of other States or by
citizens or subjects of foreign jurisdictions.").
13. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
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Almost a century later, in 1890, the Supreme Court decided Hans v.
Louisiana.4 There, the plaintiff was a citizen of Louisiana.5 He filed suit
in federal district court against Louisiana, his own state, challenging
changes to the state constitution.'6 Citing history and its understanding of
the Framers' intent, the Supreme Court observed that the Eleventh
Amendment was spurred by an interest in the principle of sovereign
immunity, and therefore embodied a broader rule than what was
explicitly provided for by the language of the Amendment.'7 In so doing,
the Court concluded, for the first time, that the Eleventh Amendment
forbade a citizen of a state from suing his own state.'"
The decision in Hans created some major problems. It effectively
prevented the citizens of a particular state from bringing a lawsuit against
that state, even when a lawsuit would otherwise be justified. Because the
states could not be sued in federal court, and because the states
controlled their own courts, there was no way for a citizen to force a state
to live up to its obligations in following its constitution and laws. These
consequences of Hans led the Court to its decision in Exparte Young. 9
In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court held that while states were
immune, a state official could be sued.2 The Court reasoned that when a
state official acts in a way that is unconstitutional, the official cannot be
doing those actions as a representative of the state." And, because the
official is not acting as a representative of the state, the official does not
have the protection provided by Hans." By holding that a state official
could be sued, the Court retreated from the harshness of Hans and
provided one possible way for citizens to stop unconstitutional state
actions.
However, the Ex parte Young exception also proved to be
problematic. The effect of Ex parte Young was that it limited Hans to a
mere exercise in proper pleading strategy. Citizens could just name and
sue state officials in place of the state in any lawsuit. As a result, the
Court narrowed the scope of the exception in Edelman v. Jordan,
holding that a plaintiff could only sue a state official in his official
capacity for prospective injunctive relief, and not damages.23
14. 134 U.S. 1 (189o).
15. Id. at i.
x6. Id. at 2.
17. Id. at 13.
i8. Id. at 21.
19. 209 U.S. 123, 129 (I9O8).
20. Id. at 159-6o.
21. Id. at x6o.
22. Id.
23. 415 U.S. 651, 665-68 ('974).
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That is the state of the law as it stands today: Citizens cannot sue
states directly, but can sue state officials for forward-looking injunctive
relief.
B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF UNITED STATES PATENT LAWS
It is noteworthy that, notwithstanding its brevity, the Constitution
specifically empowers Congress to provide for patent rights. Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 states that Congress is to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."24 To that end, Congress passed the first patent act, titled
"An act to promote the Progress of Useful Arts," in 1790.5 This act was
revisited and replaced by another act in 1793.6 In the early 18oos,
Congress passed what is now 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), which provides: "The
district courts [of the United States] shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to
patents .... Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states
in patent ... cases. '
' 7
Over the next 200 years, the federal government adopted
incremental changes to the patent system. Most notably, in October of
1982, Congress established the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit." Formed by the merger of the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals and the appellate division of the United
States Court of Claims, this new circuit had nationwide jurisdiction over,
among other things, all patent cases decided by the United States District
Courts. 9 As we will see later, the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts over patent cases is an important feature of the patent system, and
one of the reasons why the current approach should be changed.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
There have been a number of important cases implicating patent
rights and sovereign immunity in the last two decades. Before the early
1990s, the states enjoyed immunity from patent suits, much as they do
now. This Part describes the recent activity in this area of the law.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause has traditionally been interpreted to also provide for
copyrights. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 648
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. Act of Apr. 1o, 179o, ch. 7, I Stat. IO9 (repealed 1793).
26. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. ii, i Stat. 318 (repealed 1836).
27. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 648-49 n.i (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 28 U.S.C § 1338(a)
(2oo6)).
28. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).




A. CHEW V. CALIFORNIA AND THE PATENT REMEDY ACT OF 1992
In 199o, the Federal Circuit ruled on Chew v. California.3" In Chew,
the plaintiff, a resident of Ohio, held a patent that involved a "method
for testing automobile exhaust emissions."3' Chew alleged that the State
of California directly and indirectly infringed on her patent rights when
the state started requiring third parties to "test[] automobile engine
exhaust emissions [with] a process" claimed in her patent.32 Chew initially
filed a claim with the California Board of Control for compensation, but
it was rejected.33 She had the option of filing a suit in state court to
challenge the rejection of her claim, but instead chose to pursue a patent
infringement case in federal court.34 The state responded with a motion
to dismiss, "asserting its sovereign immunity from suit in the federal
court under the Eleventh Amendment."35 In her opposition to the
motion, Chew contended, inter alia, that "Congress ha[d] abrogated the
states' immunity by provisions of the patent statute and by giving
exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts to decide patent infringement
claims. ' 6 The district court rejected this argument and found for the
state, stating that abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity must be
explicit, and that no such language appeared in the patent statutes.37
The Federal Circuit affirmed." In its opinion, the court cited
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, where the Supreme Court stated
that in order for Congress to abrogate the immunity provided by the
Eleventh Amendment, it must express its "intention to abrogate.., in
unmistakable language in the statute itself."39 The Federal Circuit also
added that the "evidence of such congressional intent must be both
'unequivocal and textual.' 4 °
As Chew shows, the law at the time was that even though states
could obtain patents and enforce them on others, the states themselves
could not be sued for infringing a patent held by a private party.4 '
Sometimes, a patent holder might have the option to initiate state-level
proceedings against an infringing state, as was the case in Chew.
However, this course of action was, and still is, not available in all states.
30. 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 199o).
31. Id. at 332.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34- Id. at 332-33.
35. Id. at 333.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 336.
39. Id. at 334 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon. 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985)).
40. Id. (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223,230 (1989)).
41. See id. at 336.
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In most cases, when states do provide remedies, they are less than ideal.4"
Because of the dearth of such proceedings at the state level, such
remedies are speculative, and may exist in name only.
Dismayed by the results in cases like Chew, Congress passed the
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act43 (Patent
Remedy Act), 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h) and 296(a) in 1992.' It was enacted, in
large part, to address the imbalance that resulted from the then-current
application of the Eleventh Amendment with respect to patents. 5
Section 27(h) provides: "As used in this section, the term 'whoever'
includes any State... acting in his official capacity. ,, 6 Section 296(a)
mentions states explicitly and unambiguously: "Any State, any
instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity, shall not be
immune under the eleventh amendment..." from suits for patent
infringement.47 The act clarified, in no uncertain terms, that states could
not use the Eleventh Amendment as a shield against allegations of
patent infringement." This, however, would not remain the law very
long.
B. RECENT SUPREME COURT CASES-SEMINOLE TRIBE, CITY OF BOERNE
The 199os also brought Seminole Tribe v. Florida49 and City of
Boerne v. Flores," two of the more recent and significant cases involving
the issue of state sovereign immunity. Because these two cases were
discussed extensively by the Court in Florida Prepaid, brief descriptions
of the cases and their respective holdings are provided to give the reader
the necessary background to understand both the majority opinion and
the dissent in Florida Prepaid.
In Seminole Tribe, a case that involved Congress' enactment of the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,5' one of the issues was whether Congress
could abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its powers granted
under Article I of the Constitution. In a five to four vote, the Court held
42. This would become the focus of debate during the Court's deliberation of Florida Prepaid.
See 527 U.S. 621, 644-45 (1999); see also discussion infra Part III.
43. Pub. L. No. 102-56o, io6 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 and
35 U.S.C.).
44. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 63 1.
45. Id. at 632.
46. Id. (quoting io6 Stat. at 4230).
47. Id. 632-33.
48. Id. at 635.
49. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
50
. 
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
5I. Pub. L. No. 100-497, IO2 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166, x168
(2o06). and 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2721 (2oo6)).
52. 517 U.S. at 52-53 (discussing whether the Indian Commerce Clause of Article I of the
Constitution gave "power" to Congress to abrogate states' sovereign immunity).
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in the negative. 3 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated
that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under
Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional
limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction."54 The Court held that
Congress could not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity under
powers granted by Article I of the Constitution.5
In the following year, the Court again tackled state sovereign
immunity in City of Boerne.6 There, the dispute was whether the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of I993"7 ("RFRA") was valid under
Congress' enforcement powers granted by Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' Specifically, "[t]he parties disagree[d] over whether
RFRA [was] a proper exercise of Congress' § 5 power 'to enforce' by
'appropriate legislation' the constitutional guarantee that no State shall
deprive any person of 'life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law' nor deny any person 'equal protection of the laws."'59
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, stated first that the
power granted by Section 5 authorized Congress to pass only remedial
measures, and therefore did not allow Congress to pass laws that were
substantive in nature." It then laid out the now-famous "congruence and
proportionality" test to determine whether a law abrogating state
sovereign immunity was remedial (which would pass constitutional
muster) or if the law was an impermissible attempt by Congress to
"decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restriction on the
States.",6' Finding that RFRA, by granting new rights not provided by the
First Amendment, went beyond the remedial powers granted by Section
5, the Court struck it down.
The state sovereign immunity doctrine, after these two cases, stated
that Congress could not abrogate immunity under powers found in
Article I (Seminole Tribe), but that it could, in the right situations,
abrogate under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment (City of
Boerne). For the abrogation to be upheld by the courts, the legislation
would have to pass the "congruence and proportionality" test laid out in
City of Boerne. With these cases in mind, we now turn to Florida
Prepaid.
53. Id. at 53.
54. Id. at 72-73.
55. Id. at 76.
56. 521 U.S. 507 (i997).
57. Pub. L. No. 103-141, lO7 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 200obb (2oo6)).
58. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517; see also U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
59. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517 (quoting U.S. CoNs-r. amend XIV, § 5).
6o. Id. at 519.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 536.
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III. THE PROBLEMS WITH FLORIDA PREPAID, AND SOME SOLUTIONS
A. DISCUSSION OF FLORIDA PREPAID, AND WHY THE COURT GOT IT WRONG
In I999, the Supreme Court decided Florida Prepaid,63 a significant
case in the area of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Florida
Prepaid, and its companion case, College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Secondary Education Expense Board,64 involved, inter alia, a
business method patent held by College Savings Bank, a company based
in New Jersey.6' In Florida Prepaid, College Savings Bank alleged that
the state of Florida infringed upon the patent and sought appropriate
relief.66
The main issue in Florida Prepaid was whether Congress' abrogation
of state sovereign immunity as specified by the Patent Remedy Act was
constitutionally valid.67 If the abrogation was valid, then the Patent
Remedy Act would allow states to be sued in federal court. If, however,
Congress overstepped its authority in enacting the Act, the law would be
struck down on constitutional grounds, and the states would once again
enjoy the immunity they had prior to the Act's passage in 1992. In
deciding the issue, the Court cited heavily from Seminole Tribe and City
of Boerne.
In the case, Florida Prepaid, the accused infringer, argued that the
"Patent Remedy Act was an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to use
its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity."'' College
Savings, in response, contended that "Congress had properly exercised
its power pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the
guarantees of the Due Process Clause in § i of the Amendment." 69
Because of the results in Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne, it is
understandable why the parties in Florida Prepaid argued over which
congressional power was "doing the work." If the Court determined that
the Patent Remedy Act was a congressional act passed to further the
purposes of the Patent and Copyright Clause in Article I of the
Constitution, Seminole Tribe would instruct the Court to strike it down."
If, however, the Court held that the Act was passed as an appropriate
63. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
64. 527 U.S. 666 (i999). This case involved copyright issues and the Lanham Act, as well as the
idea of constructive waiver by the states. Id. at 669-71. The constructive waiver doctrine as applied to
state sovereign immunity was rejected by the Court. Id. at 683.
65. Id. at 671; Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 63o-31.
66. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 633.
69. Id.
70. ld. at 636.
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measure under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, then there was
still a chance that the Act would be upheld."
The Court in Florida Prepaid acknowledged this, observing that
"[w]hile reaffirming the view that state sovereign immunity does not
yield to Congress' Article I powers, this Court [has also held] that
Congress retains the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment."72 It then held, by a five to four
vote, that the Patent Remedy Act did not meet the congruence and
proportionality test as laid out in City of Boerne.73 As we will see later,
the Court unfairly and incorrectly dismissed the extent of the injury, as
reported by Congress, leading the Court to erroneously conclude that the
Patent Remedy Act went beyond what was proportional to the harm that
it was enacted to address.
In deciding the case, the Court first went through the usual two-step
state immunity abrogation analysis.74 To determine the validity of such a
move by Congress, the Court had to first answer "whether Congress has
'unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the immunity,' ... and
second, whether Congress has acted 'pursuant to a valid exercise of
power."'75 With regard to the first prong of the test, the Court found that
by providing explicitly that states "shall not be immune under the
eleventh amendment, '', 6 Congress did make "its intention to abrogate the
States' immunity 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. '
Having addressed the first question, the Court then turned to the
issue of whether Congress had "the power to compel States to surrender
their sovereign immunity for the[] purposes" of the Patent Remedy Act.7s
It noted that Congress had justified the Act under three different
"powers" granted by the Constitution: "the Patent Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl.
8; the Interstate Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; and § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment."79 The Court, citing Seminole Tribe, dismissed
both the Patent and the Commerce Clauses ° as valid grants of authority,
leaving Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as the only viable power
under which Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity via the
Patent Remedy Act."
71. Id.
72. Id. at 636-37.
73. Id. at 645-46.
74. Id. at 635.
75. Id. (quoting Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)).
76. Id. at 632 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (994)).
77. Id. at 635 (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 635-36.
8o. The Commerce Clause states: "Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States, and with Indian tribes." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. cl. 3.
81. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 636.
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With respect to the powers granted by the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court proceeded through City of Boerne's "congruence and
proportionality" test.8' The Court, while reaffirming that Section 5 was
indeed a valid power under which Congress could abrogate state
sovereign immunity, also restated that the power was a remedial one,
limiting Congress to only pass "'appropriate' enforcement legislation."8 3
According to City of Boerne, for an act of Congress to be valid, there
must be a "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. ' 4 Without
this connection, "legislation may become substantive in operation and
effect" and exceed the authority granted by Section 5.85 For example, in
City of Boerne, the Supreme Court held that RFRA granted far more
rights than what the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
required the government to provide to its citizens. 6 The Court also held
that these new rights were disproportionate to the injury identified by
Congress in the passage of the Act."7 As such, RFRA was deemed to be
substantive legislation, rather than remedial, and was struck down as an
impermissible exercise of Section 5 authority.88
The Florida Prepaid Court first sought to "identify the Fourteenth
Amendment 'evil' or 'wrong' that Congress intended to remedy," and
identified the injury as the "state infringement of patents and the use of
sovereign immunity to deny patent owners compensation for the
invasion of their patent rights."' Having determined the injury, the
Court then looked at congressional findings and the legislative history of
the Patent Remedy Act to see whether the scope of the Act was
proportional to the injury.' Here, the Court found that "Congress [had]
identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States."9' The Court
also found that the injury was not as severe as the proponents of the Act
had claimed, noting that some states had specific in-state remedies for
patent holders, and that it was merely "less convenient" to pursue state
remedies for patent infringement in other states.92
The Court also addressed the due process argument put forth by
College Savings, stating that there was no procedural due process
82. Id. at 639.
83. Id. at 638.
84. 521 U.S. 507,520 (1997).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 536.
87. Id. at 535.
88. Id. at 536.
89. 527 U.S. 627,639-40 (1999).
9o. Id. at 640.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 643 n.8.
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violation because state remedies were available.93 In dismissing the due
process claim, it wrote that "only where the State provides no remedy, or
only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its infringement
of their patent could a deprivation of property without due process
result."94
This, however, is a problematic approach to the issue presented by
Florida Prepaid. While the majority correctly identified the injury, it
failed to give the congressional findings proper treatment and respect.
First, as a threshold matter, it is unclear whether Congress should even
be held to some standard or requirement in providing findings that
support its actions before such a requirement is articulated by the
Court.95 In Florida Prepaid, the majority contended that there had not
been sufficient findings of injury in the congressional record with regards
to the Patent Remedy Act.6 City of Boerne states-as part of its
"congruence and proportionality" test-that courts should look to
congressional findings to determine how widespread the injury was at the
time of enactment.97 If the findings do not show sufficient injury, then the
related legislation will most likely fail the congruence and
proportionality test.8
However, Congress had enacted the Patent Remedy Act in 1992,
before City of Boerne was decided by the Court.99 In a dissent joined by
three other Justices, Justice Stevens raised this point in stating that when
Congress was trying to pass the Patent Remedy Act, it was "attempting
to hurdle the then-most-recent barrier this Court had erected in the
Eleventh Amendment course-the 'clear statement' rule of Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon"- and not the higher standard for
congressional findings as laid out in City of Boerne.'" He added that it
would therefore be unfair to hold Congress to a different standard that
had not yet been announced by the Court."'
Second, even if it was conceded that City of Boerne's higher
requirement for congressional findings of injury applied in this situation,
the dissent correctly pointed out that Congress did in fact make the
requisite findings for the Patent Remedy Act to meet this requirement.'2
Justice Stevens noted that Congress had heard "testimony about
inadequate state remedies for patent infringement when considering the
93. Id. at 643.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 654 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. See id. at 644-47 (majority opinion).
97. 521 U.S. 507,530-32 (1997).
98. See id. at 532.
99. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630.
ioo. Id. at 654 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Ioi. Id.
102. Id. at 655.
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Patent Remedy Act," and that it had referred to Chew v. California
during the hearings." Congress also had heard testimony that "'relief
under [state statutes] may not be a true alternative avenue of
recovery,""' 4 and that "state remedies would likely be insufficient to
compensate inventors whose patents had been infringed."'0 5 In addition,
the acting Commissioner of Patents stated at the hearings that "'[i]f
States and their instrumentalities were immune from suit in federal court
for patent infringement, patent holders would be forced to pursue
uncertain, perhaps even non-existent, remedies....... In other words, if
patent holders could not sue states in federal courts, they would have no
choice but to try their luck at whatever state-level remedies were offered
by that particular state, if it offered any remedies at all.
Furthermore, the dissent stressed Congress' findings that "state
infringement of patents was likely to increase."'" The majority dismissed
this as mere "speculative harm.""'  However, as New Star Lasers,'"
Xechem Int'l,"' Tegic Communications,"' Genentech,"' and Biomedical
Patent Management"3 show, these kinds of cases are only increasing in
frequency, especially now that states consider themselves immune from
all lawsuits related to patents."' In each of these cases, all of which were
brought after Florida Prepaid, states were ultimately able to invoke their
immunity and escape liability."5 The rate at which patents are issued is
103. Id.
104. Id. at 656 (quoting Patent Remedy Clarification Act. Hearing on H.R. 3886 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
1oist Cong. 33 (i99o) (statement of Robert P. Merges, Professor of Law, Boston University School of
Law) (alteration in original) [hereinafter Patent Remedy Clarification Act Hearing]); see also id. at 656
n.7.
105. Id. at 656.
io6. Id. (quoting Patent Remedy Clarification Act Hearing, supra note io4, at 15 (statement of
Jeffrey M. Samuels, Acting Comm'r of Patents and Trademarks, U.S. Department of Commerce)).
107. Id.
Io8. Id. at 641 (majority opinion).
io9. New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1241-42 (E.D. Cal.
'999).
i to. Xechem Int'l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
i i i. Tegic Commc'ns Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys., 458 F.3d 1335, 1337-39 (Fed.
Cir. 2oo6).
112. Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998), vacated, 527 U.S.
1031 (1999).
113. Biomedical Patent Mgmt. Corp. v. Cal. Dep't of Health Servs. (BMPC II), 505 F.3d 1328,
1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
114. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 656-57
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing at least five other similar cases).
115. BPMC If, 505 F.3d at 1343; Tegic Commc'ns, 458 F.3 d at 1344-45; Xechem Int'l, 382 F.3d at
1332; Genentech, 527 U.S. at 1031 (vacating and remanding to appellate court for proceedings
consistent with Florida Prepaid); New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d
1240, 1245 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
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only increasing, matched only by the growth in their potential value in
the marketplace."' Patent infringement lawsuits, which are also more
numerous than just ten years ago, now command awards of millions of
dollars."' Patent licensing has also become more lucrative."' It stands to
reason, then, that if states considered themselves immune from patent
infringement actions and acted with impunity, situations involving patent
infringement by state actors would also only increase in number, thereby
resulting in even more injury to private patent holders.
Next, the Florida Prepaid dissent addressed the majority's
contention that there was no procedural due process violation because
state remedies for such situations did exist."9 The dissent noted that it
was "ironic" for the majority to use this to support their argument,
"[g]iven that Congress had long ago pre-empted state jurisdiction over
patent infringement cases."'.. Because of this preemption, the dissent
argued, "it was surely reasonable for Congress to assume that such
remedies simply did not exist ....' To put it another way, it is entirely
reasonable that because states are preempted from deciding issues
regarding patents, and are forced to leave such matters to the federal
courts, they felt no compelling need to establish adequate state remedies
for patent infringement. In fact, it would be illogical for states to set up
remedies for patent infringement when they could never have
jurisdiction over such cases. To then require Congress to look for and
consider each possible remedy for each state is at best unfair, and at
worst nonsensical.
Even if a state did offer remedies through state courts and state-level
commissions, they would still be inadequate. As Justice Stevens noted,
"[s]tate judges have never had the exposure to patent litigation that
federal judges have experienced for decades ..... Because state officials
and judges would not have the same amount of familiarity and expertise,
their decisions would have more potential for error and unjust results.
The other argument made by Justice Stevens in the dissent, which is
not addressed by the majority opinion in any depth, is about the interest
I 6. See Joseph P. Cook, On Understanding the Increase in U.S. Patent Litigation, 9 Am. L. & ECON.
REV. 48, 49, 64 (2007); see also ATHENA ALLIANCE & CONG. ECON. LEADERSHIP INST., IS THE US PATENT
SYSTEM ENDANGERING AMERICAN INNOVATION? 2-3, 7 (2005), available at http://www.athenaalliance.org/
pdf/patentjreform.pdf (summarizing remarks of and charts provided by Adam Jaffe).
117. Cook, supra note 1 16, at 59.
118. Stuart Weinberg, After EBay Ruling, Patent Injunctions No Longer Automatic, MARKET
WATCH (WEEKEND EDITION), June 1, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/after-ebay-ruling-
patent-injunctions/story.aspx?guid=(4D ICEoE8-4 CB5-4D 35 -B 3 B8-ABEiC9 671F2o).
1 19. 527 U.S. at 657 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
I2o. Id. at 658.
I2I. Id.
122. Id. at 659.
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in the principle of national uniformity.'23 It is Congress and the federal
government, and not the states, that are granted the authority over
patents in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution.2 4 The reason
for this, as stated by Justice Story, is that if individual states were to
possess authority over patents instead of the federal government, the
inventors "'would be subjected to the varying laws and systems of the
different states on this subject, which would impair, and might even
destroy the value of their rights."...5 The Court's decision in Florida
Prepaid makes it possible for some patent infringement cases to be heard
in state courts, thereby evading the reach of the federal courts and
undermining the integrity of the nationwide system.
Moreover, resort to state-level remedies is problematic because
Congress "provided for exclusive jurisdiction of patent infringement
litigation in the federal courts" nearly 200 years ago, '26 and as a result,
federal courts are best suited to handle such cases. As noted above,
Justice Stevens pointed out that the remedy of adjudication in state
courts would be inadequate because state court judges do not have the
same level of familiarity with patents as federal judges.'27 Furthermore,
even if state judges were just as capable as their federal court
counterparts in the area of patent cases, uniformity of the law would still
be a major issue. Justice Stevens highlighted this point, writing that with
state-level remedies, "unlike infringement actions brought in federal
district courts, the[] decisions would not be reviewable in the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit....2s To put it in another way, patent cases
decided by a state court judge could not enjoy the main feature of the
current system that almost guarantees uniformity -review by the Court
of Appeals of the Federal Circuit. As the Court discusses in Katz, the
principle of national uniformity is a compelling interest,' 9 and one that
was given less than adequate treatment by the Court in Florida Prepaid.
B. KATZ, AND How KATZ APPLIES
In 2oo6, the Supreme Court revisited the Eleventh Amendment
issue in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz.'3" Katz involved the
United States Bankruptcy Code, and its application to state agencies in
123. Id. at 649.
124. Id. at 648; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
125. Id. at 649-50 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 502, at 402 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., 1987) (1891)).
126. Id. at 648.
127. Id. at 659.
128. Id.
129. 546 U.S. 356, 376 n.13 (2oo6). Indeed, this concept of the need for national uniformity
contributed to the Court's decision in Katz. Id.
130. Id. at 359.
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Virginia.' 3 ' The issue there was whether § io6(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, as amended in 1994,3' validly abrogated state sovereign
immunity. '
The Court, in another five to four decision, ruled that § i06(a),
enacted by Congress under the powers granted to it by the Bankruptcy
Clause of the Constitution, was a valid abrogation of state sovereign
immunity.'34 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, addressed at the
outset the seeming contradiction between this decision and the Court's
decision in Seminole Tribe.'35 Because the Bankruptcy Clause is also an
Article I provision, it was thought that the Court might reach the same
result here as it did in Florida Prepaid and find the abrogation to be
invalid. Justice Stevens recognized this, writing, "[w]e acknowledge that
statements in both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Seminole
Tribe... reflected an assumption that the holding in that case would
apply to the Bankruptcy Clause."'' 6 Despite this, however, Justice
Stevens wrote that such statements in Seminole Tribe were merely dicta,
and that the Court was "not bound to follow ... dicta in a prior case in
which the point now at issue was not fully debated."' 37 Instead of just
simply following Seminole Tribe, the Court looked at the Bankruptcy
Clause and found that the rationale and history of the Clause was
compelling enough such that Seminole Tribe did not apply, even though
the Clause in question was a provision in Article I38
Thus, a narrow reading of Katz is that the Bankruptcy Clause, as
contained in Article I, Section 8, Clause 4, is a valid power under which
Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity.'39 Katz, however,
could also stand for the broader proposition that certain provisions in
Article I can serve as valid powers with which Congress can abrogate
sovereign immunity.
In support of its decision, the majority in Katz pointed to, inter alia,
the special nature of bankruptcy laws and the need for national
uniformity.'40 Justice Stevens, this time writing for the majority, noted
i31. Id. at 359-6o.
132. Section io6(a) states in part, "[n]otwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity,
sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit." ii U.S.C. § xo6(a) (2006). The term
"governmental unit" is defined to include a "State" or "municipality," and a "department, agency, or
instrumentality of... a State." Id. § 101(27).
133. Katz, 546 U.S. at 361 ("We granted certiorari to consider... whether Congress' attempt to
abrogate state sovereign immunity in it U.S.C. § io6(a) is valid." (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted)).
134. Id. at 359.
135. Id. at 363.
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821)).
138. Id. at 377.
139. Id. at 379.
140. See id. at 376 n.13.
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that, unlike England, the newly formed United States faced "difficulties
posed by [a] patchwork of insolvency and bankruptcy laws" of the
various states. 4 ' The majority also noted that "[t]he several States[] had
wildly divergent schemes for discharging debtors and their debts. At least
four jurisdictions offered relief through private Acts of their
legislatures.... Some jurisdictions provided no relief at all for the
debtor."'42 Finally, the Court, in looking at the legislative history
surrounding the Bankruptcy Clause, took the "absence of extensive
debate over the text of the Bankruptcy Clause" as a sign that there was
"general agreement on the importance of authorizing a uniform federal
response" to the problems presented by differing laws and approaches
among the states.'43 Because of the special nature and history of the
Bankruptcy Clause, the majority allowed this provision to break through
the Article I bar that the Court articulated in Seminole Tribe.'"
In the same way, such arguments could also be made for the Patent
and Copyright Clause of Article I. Both the Patent Clause and the
Bankruptcy Clause deal with issues that require national uniformity.'45
As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent in Florida Prepaid, the
patent system of this country was established so that patent holders
would not have to navigate different systems between states. I46 If a
federal system was not in place, each state would have to have its own
system of registering and issuing patents. A patent holder would then
have to file and prosecute fifty different patent applications to ensure
coverage across the country. Otherwise, an inventor could conceivably
receive patent protection in one state, but not in another. Much like the
bankruptcy system, for the patent system to work, it has to be maintained
centrally by the federal government, governed under a uniform set of
laws. As such, the federal judiciary should have jurisdiction over states in
patent related lawsuits, as they do in the area of bankruptcy.
Another similarity between the two clauses is the exclusive federal
jurisdiction over both types of cases. Like cases involving patent rights,
bankruptcy matters can only be filed in federal court.'47 This feature
helps to preserve uniformity in the law, reducing the number of possible
differing interpretations of the relevant statutes. Justice Stevens'
141. Id. at 366, 376 n.13.
142. Id. 365-66 (citations omitted).
143. Id. at 369.
144. Id. at 377-79.
145. Compare id. at 376 n.13 (explaining the role the need for uniformity played in the
development and interpretation of the Bankruptcy Clause), with Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 649--50 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the
importance of uniformity to any meaningful system of patent enforcement).
146. Fla, Prepaid, 527 U.S at 65o (quoting STORY, supra note 125).
147. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2006).
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comments about the difference between state judges and federal judges
in the area of patents apply equally well to bankruptcy law.'4'
As stated above, the narrow holding of Katz is that the legislation by
Congress in pursuit of Article I's Bankruptcy Clause can abrogate state
sovereign immunity.'49 Because the Patent Clause shares many of the
essential characteristics of the Bankruptcy Clause, it would only require
a logical extension by the Court to also abrogate state sovereign
immunity for matters related to patent rights. 5 '
C. THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
With the Court's decision in Florida Prepaid, the states are once
again immune from suits alleging patent infringement. In fact, cases that
were still being litigated at the time of the Court's decision in Florida
Prepaid had to be reversed or remanded because of Florida Prepaid."'
For example, in Genentech v. Regents of the University of California, a
case involving, inter alia, a declaratory judgment action against the
University of California, the Federal Circuit ruled that because the
university sought and owned the patents, they effectively waived any
claim to immunity and could be sued.'52 However, after Florida Prepaid
was announced in 1999, the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit's
judgment in Genentech and remanded it back for further consideration in
light of Florida Prepaid.'53
In the years since, numerous cases implicating state sovereignty and
patent rights have reached the courts, contrary to the visions of the
majority in Florida Prepaid. Unsurprisingly, these cases have generally
been decided in favor of the states. For example, in both Tegic and
Xechem, states were able to invoke Eleventh Amendment immunity and
escape liability.'54
There is, however, sentiment growing once again, that the current
system is unfair. In New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the University of
California, a case decided after Florida Prepaid, Chief Judge Shubb of
148. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 659 ("State judges have never had the exposure to patent litigation
that federal judges have experienced for decades ... ).
149. See discussion supra note 139 and accompanying text.
I5o. Cf. Biomedical Patent Mgmt. Corp. v. Cal. Dep't of Health Servs. (BPMC 1), No. C 06-00737
MHP, 2006 WL 1530177, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2006), affid, 505 F.3 d. 1328, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(addressing the possible effect of Katz on Florida Prepaid, but finding that the Supreme Court had not
yet made that logical extension, and declining to do so in the absence of Supreme Court precedent).
151. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446 (Fed Cir. 1998), vacated,
527 U.S. 1031 (1999).
152. Id. at 1454.
153. See Genentech, 527 U.S. at IO3 I . The parties settled. Marcia Barinaga, Genetech, UC Settle
Suit for $2oo Million, 286 SCIENCE 1655 (1999).
154. Tegic Commc'ns Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys., 458 F.3d 1335, 1344-45 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); Xechem Int'l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3 d 1324, 1332 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
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the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
expressed concern about such unfairness.155 Referring to the states'
practice of seeking and obtaining patents, but invoking state sovereign
immunity whenever a lawsuit is brought against them, he stated, "[t]he
Regents wish to take the good without the bad. The court can conceive
of no other context in which a litigant may lawfully enjoy all the benefits
of a federal property or right, while rejecting its limitations."' 6 In New
Star, the court found that because the Regents acquired the patent, they
had waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity."'
In BPMC v. California Department of Health Services, another
federal district court judge expressed the same concerns. Judge Marilyn
Hall Patel of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California wrote that "[t]he court is indeed troubled by the University of
California's ability to reap the benefits of the patent system without
being exposed to liability for infringement. Similarly situated private
universities enjoy no such advantage.'"8
Even though California prevailed in its motion to dismiss in BPMC
I,"' and New Star Lasers received negative treatment by the Federal
Circuit in Xechem,' 6° these cases still show a certain level of discomfort
with the current situation.
D. POSSIBLE APPROACHES
Since the decision in Florida Prepaid, there has been no shortage of
commentary on how the system could be rebalanced. The three different
approaches most commonly proposed are (I) waiver through the
Spending Clause, (2) new legislation, and (3) a revisit of Florida Prepaid
by the Supreme Court. An analysis of each approach is presented below,
followed by a suggestion for a slightly different approach.
i. The Spending Clause
The first approach would be for Congress to invoke its power under
the Spending Clause and nudge the states into waiving the immunity in
all patent cases. 6' The Spending Clause allows Congress flexibility and
155. 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
156. Id. at 1244.
157. Id. at 1245. This case is no longer considered good law, however, because of the negative
treatment it received from the Federal Circuit in Xechem. 382 F.3 d at 1331.
I58. No. C 06-00737 MHP, 2006 WL 1530177, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2006), affd, 505 F.3d. 1328,
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
159. Id. at *7-
i6o. Xechem Int'l, 382 F.3 d at 1331.
161. See, e.g., Jennifer Cotner, Note, How the Spending Clause Can Solve the Dilemma of State
Sovereign Immunity from Intellectual Property Suits, 51 DUKE L.J. 713, 714 (2001); Jennifer Poise,
Comment, Holding the Sovereign's Universities Accountable for Patent Infringement After Florida
Prepaid and College Savings Bank, 89 CAL. L. REv. 507, 530 (2001).
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latitude in how it allocates spending on the states. 62 In South Dakota v.
Dole, one of the seminal cases involving the Spending Clause, the
Supreme Court held that Congress could attach conditions on the funds
that it gives to the states, provided that the condition is (i) placed in the
pursuit of the "general welfare," (2) unambiguous to the states, (3)
related to the federal interest or program, and (4) is not barred by other
constitutional provisions.' 63 As other commentators have noted, the
Spending Clause could be one way to address the problem.'6 4 Continued
maintenance and refinement of the patent system would be in the
general welfare of the country and related to the federal interest of
fostering and promoting innovation, and the conditions could be made
sufficiently clear to hurdle the second prong of the test. Also, this
approach has been successful in getting around sovereign immunity in
other contexts, most notably with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 '65 and
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 66 both of which allow
lawsuits against states.'
67
However, the same commentators fail to realize that reliance on the
Spending Clause is a suboptimal way of addressing the problem.
Sovereign immunity could be quickly reestablished, if, due to either
congressional oversight in language-drafting or exceptionally strong
lobbying by the states, the conditions are removed in a subsequent
budget proposal or bill. More specifically, such an approach would only
be successful in abrogating sovereign immunity if (i) the states accept
federal funds on the condition that they "waive" their immunity and (2)
the language of the bill or act is clear that the waiver of sovereign
immunity is a condition for those funds. If, for example, a bill containing
the requisite language is passed, but then is later repealed or modified,
patent holders will be back at square one with respect to their rights
against the states.
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. i. ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States."). The "general welfare" language has been interpreted to grant Congress its flexibility
and latitude in spending-related matters. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) ("The first of
these limitations is derived from the language of the Constitution itself: the exercise of the spending
power must be in pursuit of 'the general welfare.' In considering whether a particular expenditure is
intended to serve general public purposes, courts should defer substantially to the judgment of
Congress." (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).
r63. 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987).
164. See sources cited supra note 161.
r65. Pub. L. No. 93-112,87 Stat. 355 (973) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
166. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (199o) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
167. See AARP, Legal Advocacy: Miller v. Texas Tech Univ. Health Sciences 1 (2003)
(unpublished report, on file with The Hastings Law Journal) ("Most federal courts have ruled that
because states can elect not to receive federal funds and thereby avoid the need to comply with the
Rehab Act, when they do accept federal funds, they waive their 'sovereign immunity."').
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2. New Legislation - The Intellectual Property Protection
Restoration Act
The next two approaches would yield a more permanent result.
First, Congress could pass new legislation that closely mirrors the
language from the Patent Remedy Act. And in fact, in the years since
Florida Prepaid, members of Congress have tried to pass a reincarnated
version of the Patent Remedy Act, called the Intellectual Property
Protection Restoration Act of 2003'68 ("IPPRA"). The IPPRA, if passed,
would have provided that:
[I]n actions against an officer or employee of a State or its
instrumentality for violations of provisions of Federal copyright or
patent laws ... remedies shall be available against such individual in
the same manner and to the same extent as they [are] available in an
action against a private individual under like circumstances.'6
United States Senator Leahy, in a statement regarding the hearings on
the IPPRA, stated his belief that there was "an urgent need for Congress
to respond to the Florida Prepaid decisions.' 7. He also added that, "[a]
recent GAO study confirmed that, as the law now stands, owners of
intellectual property have few or no alternatives or remedies available
against State infringers-just a series of dead ends."''7' Unfortunately,
after the Supreme Court's treatment of the Patent Remedy Act, it
appears that Congress is unwilling to try their hand at addressing the
issue again. Even though the IPPRA has been introduced in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate at least six times between I999
and 2003, it has never passed.'72 Additionally, in the recently proposed
Patent Reform Act of 2007,"'3 there was no mention of abrogating state
sovereign immunity.
3. Overturning Florida Prepaid
Lastly, if the legislative approach is unsuccessful or deemed
unfeasible, a more risky and drastic plan of attack is available-the
reinstatement of the Patent Remedy Act. Patent holders could achieve
this by seeking to overturn the Court's decision in Florida Prepaid. Even
though the Court invalidated it, the language of the Patent Remedy Act
is, as they say, "still on the books." For this to happen, a patent holder
could bring a patent infringement suit against a state in federal district
court, seeking relief. The district court would dismiss the case,
168, See H.R. 2344, Io8th Cong. (2003), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congresslbill.xpd?bill=
hio8-2344; see also AAAS-Science & Intellectual Property in the Public Interest, http://
sippi.aaas.orglipissuesllegislation/?res-id=53 (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).
169. AAAS-Science & Intellectual Property in the Public Interest, supra note 168.
17o. Leahy, supra note 5.
171. Id.
172. Govtrack.us, H.R. 2344: Intellection Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hIo8-2344&tab=related (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).
173. See S. 1145, 1ioth Cong. (2007).
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whereupon the patent holder would appeal. The Federal Circuit would
affirm the dismissal, citing Florida Prepaid, leaving the patent holder the
next step of filing for a writ of certiorari. If the Supreme Court felt so
inclined, it could reconsider Florida Prepaid and decide whether or not
to overturn it. More than likely, the certiorari request would be denied.
However, there is a chance that because the Court was so closely divided
on this issue (as evidenced by the five to four split in both Florida
Prepaid and in Katz), a well-chosen test case could potentially get the
four votes needed for certiorari to be granted. "4
Such a suggestion is not as crazy as it sounds. Statutes previously
invalidated by the courts have been reinstated by subsequent actions by
the Court, with the added benefit that no further action is required of
Congress. For example, in the early i9oos, Congress passed a law that
provided minimum wages for women and children.' 5 The Supreme Court
held this law to be unconstitutional in Adkins v. Children's Hospital.1
6
However, in 1937, the Supreme Court revisited the issue in West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, and overruled Adkins.1 7 The Court's decision had
the effect of immediately reinstating the minimum wage statute struck
down by Adkins.
7 8
Even though the likelihood of success seems low, patent holders,
such as BPMC, have taken this approach in an effort to get the Supreme
Court to address the issue of state sovereignty again.'7 9 As the discussion
of Florida Prepaid and Katz illustrates, there is ample justification for the
Court to revisit the issue, especially in light of the Article I exception the
Court carved out for itself in Katz.' In fact, as it often does when
seriously contemplating granting certiorari, the Supreme Court invited
the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the federal government's
view on the BPMC case. ' The Solicitor General's brief, which was filed
in December 2008, recommended that BPMC's petition for certiorari be
denied. s2 And, although certiorari was denied by the Court earlier this
174. Of course, such a scenario would be heavily dependent on the fact that newly seated Justice
Alito would vote the same way as the Justice he replaced (Justice O'Connor), an assumption that
seems dubious given his decision in Chittister v. Department of Community & Economic Development,
226 F.3 d 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that Congress did not validly abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
when they passed the Family and Medical Leave Act).
175. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 539-42 (1923).
176. Id. at 56o-6i.
177. 300 U.S. 379, 400 (937)-
178. Jawish v. Morlet, 86 A.2d 96, 97 (D.C. 1952).
179. See, e.g., Adele Nicholas, IP Owners Challenge State Immunity from Infringement, INSIDE
COUNSEL, Jan. 2, 2008, at 2, available at http://www.insidecounsel.com/lssues/20o8/January%202oo08/
Pages/IP-Owners-Challenge-State-Immunity-from-Infringement.aspx (noting BPMC's announcement
of intent to appeal to the Supreme Court).
18o. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356,358-79 (20o6).
181. Biomedical Patent Mgmt. Corp. v. Cal. Dep't of Health Servs., 128 S. Ct. 2076 (2008) (Mem.).
182. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16, Biomedical Patent Mgmt. Corp., No. 07-
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year,'8 3 this approach remains a possible avenue for supporters of
reform.'
84
4. A New Approach-Extension of 28 U.S.C. § 1498
As discussed in above,' Congress has had multiple opportunities to
pass the IPPRA, an act that would restore patent holders' rights, but has
not done so. One possible approach, which has not yet been put forth, is
new legislation that would extend 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to also include states.
As it currently stands, § 1498 allows patent holders to sue the U.S.
government for the use of their inventions without their permission.
I
For policy reasons, the relief is limited to monetary damages, and does
not allow for injunctive relief.' T However, the patentee has a clear path
to some form of recourse.' 8' Extending the statute, or enacting an
analogous statute so that it also covers infringement by states would
protect the rights of patent holders against infringement by states in the
same way that they are protected against infringement by the United
States government. Such an act by Congress would necessarily face the
same scrutiny as the Patent Remedy Act. However, for reasons I will
explain, there is a good chance that a provision analogous to § 1498
would pass constitutional muster.
First, Congress could make it clear that it is acting under the power
granted to it by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the law
change is a remedial measure designed to provide a solution to the injury
faced by patent holders. Because Congress has City of Boerne available
as a guide, it now knows to conduct its due diligence and provide a
thorough record of injury.' Also, because there have been more patent
956, 2oo8 WL 5266625 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2008).
183. Biomedical Patent Mgmt. Corp. v. Cal. Dep't of Health Servs., 129 S. Ct. 895 (2009).
184. For more on the BPMC certiorari petition and the strategies that were employed by both
sides, see generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Biomedical Patent Mgmt. Corp., No.
07-956, 2008 WL 5o83o84 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2oo8), and Supplemental Brief for Petitioner, Biomedical
Patent Mgmt. Corp., No. 07-956, 2008 WL 5266625 (U.S. Dec. 17, 2008).
185. See discussion supra Part II.D.2.
186. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2oo6) (establishing a remedy for patent infringement by the United States).
187. Dearborn Chem. Co. v. Arvey Corp.. 114 F. Supp. 369, 371 (N.D. Ill. 1953) ("The purpose of
the ... statute is basically and primarily a governmental one, 'The statute was designed to furnish the
patentees an adequate and effective remedy while saving the government from having its public works
tied up and thwarted while private parties are carrying on a long drawn out litigation."' (citation
omitted)); David R. Lipson, We're Not Under Title 35 Anymore: Patent Litigation Against the United
States Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(A), 33 PUB. CoNT. LJ. 243, 249-50 ("[T]he Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court's refusal to grant that injunction, explaining that 'Section 1498(a) would be emasculated
if a patentee could enjoin bidding to supply infringing products .... [A] patent owner may not use its
patent to cut the government off from sources of supply, either at the bid stage or during performance
of a government contract."' (alternation in original) (footnote omitted) (citing Trojan v. Shat-R-
Shield, Inc., 885 F.2d 854, 856-57 (1989)).
188. See id.
189. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-19 (I997) (striking down RFRA, but holding
that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does provide authority for Congress to abrogate states'
March 2009]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
infringement cases involving states since Florida Prepaid, it will be easier
for Congress to make its findings that this is a problem deserving of a
remedy." Finally, because the relief available will be limited to monetary
damages, the Supreme Court is more likely to find that the proposed bill
meets the "congruence and proportionality" test as established in City of
Boerne.'9 ' Indeed, if the relief available is narrowed, the Court might be
more inclined to hold that the statute was in proportion to the harm
made clear by the number of cases where patent holders were left
without recourse after a state had infringed their patent rights.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of state sovereign immunity has come a long way since
Hans v. Louisiana. In the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has
visited the issue numerous times, with each decision changing the
doctrine in measured amounts. In the area of patent law, the discussion
over whether states should enjoy such immunity has only heated up
during this time. With patents becoming an even more lucrative "gold
mine," cases between states and private individuals will only increase. In
situations where a state owns a patent and it is infringed upon by the
private sector, the state is almost always more than vigilant in protecting
its rights against infringers. The state has full access to all the remedies
provided by the patent statutes and to the federal courts. In contrast,
when a private individual or entity owns a patent and a state, or its
instrumentalities, infringes the patent, the private individual cannot seek
the same remedies in the same courts. It is simply unfair to allow states to
enjoy all the benefits and protection of patent rights, but suffer none of
the drawbacks.
The Court was wrong in its decision of Florida Prepaid. The dissent's
concern of increasing injury to patent holders, which the majority
dismissed as "speculative harm," has been realized in the years since.
With its decision in Katz, the Court seems to have created an opening for
itself so that, should the decision in Florida Prepaid be reconsidered, the
holding might come out in a similar way to Katz. Also, Congress could
use its Spending Clause power and tie the receipt of funds to a general
waiver of sovereign immunity in cases involving patents. Congress could
propose spending bills that tie a condition of waiver with respect to
patent infringement suits in exchange for federal funding. Additionally,
those harmed by the current scheme could push Congress to make
further attempts to pass laws that provide recourse for patent holders in
pursuing infringement actions against states. Finally, the issue could be
sovereign immunity as long as Congress does so remedially); see also discussion supra Part II.B.
19o. See discussion supra Part III.C.
191. See 521 U.S. at 519.
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brought to the Supreme Court for reconsideration. Despite the events of
the last ten years, proponents for a change to the current law should
continue this multipronged approach to eventually obtaining a level
playing field for all players in the world of patents.
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